By its judgment in Karakasidis v. Greece of 16 December 2025 (Application no. 46737/20), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found Greece in violation of the presumption of innocence, censuring the domestic courts’ practice of impermissibly shifting onto the accused the burden of proving his innocence, thereby undermining in practice the guarantee enshrined in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

On 8 November 2011, the applicant was subjected to a random traffic stop. During the check, the police discovered, in a box located in the spare-wheel compartment of his car, approximately thirty pieces of jewellery and a number of precious stones. When questioned as to their origin, he stated that the jewellery belonged to his wife and that he had temporarily placed it in the vehicle for safety reasons, since a burglary had taken place at his home a few months earlier—an incident he had reported to the authorities. Those explanations were not accepted and a case file was opened against him for the offence of receiving the proceeds of crime. In December 2012, the jewellery and precious stones were deposited with the Consignment Deposits and Loans Fund.

The applicant was ultimately convicted at first instance of receiving the proceeds of crime, and his appeal was dismissed. The appellate court attached particular weight to the fact that the jewellery had been found hidden in the vehicle and that the accused’s explanations were not considered convincing. Specifically, the second-instance court held that the accused had failed to substantiate his claim that the items belonged to his wife. In the appellate court’s view, the particular circumstances of the discovery allowed the inference that the jewellery originated from criminal activity and that the accused was aware of its unlawful provenance.

The ensuing appeal on points of law was dismissed, with the result that the conviction became final. In particular, the Court of Cassation considered the appellate reasoning sufficient, accepting that the necessary factual findings had been set out to substantiate the offence ascribed to the applicant—especially as regards his knowledge of the unlawful origin—and adding that no further specific elements were required beyond the finding that the jewellery had been discovered in the car and did not belong to the accused’s wife.

The ECtHR observed that the presumption of innocence may not remain a mere proclamation, but constitutes a substantive rule governing criminal proceedings. The burden of proving the accused’s guilt lies with the prosecution. According to the Court, domestic legal systems may resort to presumptions or inferences from facts only subject to conditions. Such inferences must remain within reasonable limits, be grounded on a strong factual basis, and must not lead—directly or indirectly—to an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof (“burden shifting”).

In line with that approach, the decisive issue is not whether the explanation offered by the accused is persuasive, but whether guilt is sufficiently established on the basis of specific, verifiable evidence and factual findings. The ECtHR thus held that the reasoning of the domestic decisions was deficient both with regard to proof of the unlawful origin of the items and proof of the accused’s knowledge thereof. In particular, the conviction was not based on clear evidence linking the items to a specific offence (for example, an identified theft, a victim, the relevant time frame, or the manner of commission), nor on indications demonstrating that the applicant knew—or, on the basis of specific factual circumstances, ought to have known—the unlawful provenance of the items discovered.

Instead, the finding of guilt rested on the manner in which the jewellery was discovered and on the fact that the applicant had not sufficiently proved his wife’s ownership claim. In that way, however, the evidentiary burden was impermissibly shifted from the prosecution to the accused, since guilt was essentially derived from the accused’s failure to establish his own version of events.

The ECtHR held that this approach violated Article 6 § 2 and, consequently, affected the overall fairness of the proceedings under Article 6 § 1, in particular because the conviction was not accompanied by sufficiently reasoned and reviewable grounds capable of demonstrating—on the basis of specific evidentiary data—first, why the items in question constituted the proceeds of crime, and second, why the accused was aware of their unlawful origin. The Court awarded the applicant just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage and a sum in respect of costs and expenses, recognising that the proceedings leading to the conviction had not complied with the minimum guarantees of Article 6.

The significance of the judgment is particularly far-reaching, as the Court clarifies that the principle of “moral proof” and the free assessment of evidence cannot operate as a mechanism for filling evidentiary gaps nor serve to legitimise judicial conjecture. Rather, prosecuting authorities must establish guilt on the basis of specific, sufficiently delineated and verifiable evidentiary material, even where the assessment concerns elements of the subjective side of the offence. At the same time, the judgment highlights the functional link between the presumption of innocence and the principle of in dubio pro reo, and strengthens the requirement of adequate and specific reasoning as an institutional safeguard against arbitrariness and as a prerequisite for review of judicial reasoning under standards of logical and legal coherence.

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